The Southern Transitional Council (STC), on Saturday 25 April 2020, announced self-administration and declared a state of emergency across South Yemen, most notably in Aden, the interim capital of the Republic of Yemen. This was followed by measures confirming it was progressing in its steps aimed at dividing Yemen.

The decision of the STC, supported by UAE, was met with local and international reactions that were mostly condemning and rejecting of the move. Local authorities in six southern governorates out of a total of eight rejected the STC’s declaration and confirmed their adherence to legitimacy and their loyalty to President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi.

For its part, the Arab Coalition announced the necessity of rescinding any step that violates the Riyadh Agreement, referring to STC’s announcement of self-rule, and asserted that it had taken practical steps to implement the agreement that represents the framework that the two parties agreed upon (the legitimate government and the STC). Five days after the escalation (on May 1) the STC, through its media spokesman, welcomed the statement of the Arab Coalition. However, the progress of events since the formation of the transitional council indicates a series of measures aimed at changing balances and imposing a fait accompli on the ground.

An assessment of the situation is discussed herein in the context of STC’s declaration of ‘self-administration’ – its motives, political and military developments, and prospects for escalation in Yemen.

What STC’s announcement entails

The announcement of the STC included seven measures, justifying their move due to the Yemeni government’s: refusal to pay the salaries of its forces and retirees, halting its support for the military services, not caring for the families of the martyrs, the deterioration of public services, and fuelling rivalries and supporting terrorism. The seven measures are:

First: Declaring a general state of emergency in the capital, Aden, and in all of the southern governorates; and mandating STC military forces to take post starting April 25, 2020.

Second: Declaring self-administration for the south of the country, starting at midnight on Saturday, April 25, 2020, and enacting a self-managing committee to begin carrying out its duties according to its specified tasks.

Third: Inviting the masses to support the leadership of the STC.

Fourth: Forming committees to monitor the performance of public institutions and to combat corruption, and to coordinate with the President of the National Assembly and the heads of council leaders in the governorates on that mission.

Fifth: Entrusting economic, legal, military and security committees in the council to direct the work of the bodies, to implement self-administration.

Sixth: Inviting governors of the southern governorates and officials of public institutions from the south to continue their work.

Seventh: Calling on the Arab Coalition and the international community to support the council’s procedures in self-administration.

It is noteworthy that the transitional council use the term “self-administration” which is currently in force in northern Syria and has the support of some countries under the pretext of “fighting terrorism”. Here, they are trying – through this “transition” – to benefit from the Syrian experience, and to circumvent the need for international recognition and minimise political and legal consequences in the event of a secession being declared.

Motives of the Southern Transitional Council

–  Escaping the levies of the Riyadh Agreement, signed on November 5, 2019, especially with regard to the military aspect of handing over weapons and merging its security belts.

–  Fear of a declining popularity of the STC in the governorates involved, as evidenced by the statement of Ahmed Saeed bin Brik, President of the National Assembly in the STC on April 26 about the demonstrations and conspiracies taking place in Aden.

–  Preventing the prime minister and some ministers from returning to Aden, upon their return from Riyadh airport two days before the council was announced, at which time the ban was linked to the coalition allowing some of its leaders to return to Aden, which was prevented upon trying to leave Amman airport, on March 11, 2020.

–  Their belief that the opportunity to consolidate their control over some southern governorates is due to the weakness of the Yemeni government, the struggles of its members, the losses of the national army to the Naham region, and the concern of the international community in combating the Corona pandemic.

–  It is highly predicted that the UAE backed this move for fear that its influence in the southern and eastern governorates would recede to Saudi Arabia, which took over the administration of the coalition in those areas. Indeed, the transitional leaderships are present in Abu Dhabi.

Local stances

Local, popular and elitist positions were affected by the content and context of the STC’s announcement. Essentially, the content of the declaration (self-administration of the south) was a coup against the functions of the Yemeni government and the sovereignty of its state. The STC’s declaration came without any preamble to set the scene or gain support, such as demonstrations demanding the declaration of self-administration.

–  Yemeni government

The Yemeni government considered the actions of April 26 – the announcement of the STC – a clear act of rebellion against it, and a clear coup against the Riyadh Agreement and state institutions. The Yemeni government holds the transitional council and its leadership responsible for not implementing the Riyadh Agreement, and for undertaking a complete coup on April 25, 2020. The government called on the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy to withstand its historic responsibilities towards the territorial unity and integrity of the Republic of Yemen, and called on the international community and regional and international organisations to condemn the STC’s coup.

–  Local authorities

The positions of the local authorities in the southern governorates represents the key objection against the state of self-administration, as six of eight local authorities – Shabwa, Hadramout, Abyan, Al-Mahrah, Socotra and Lahj – rejected the STC’s statement declaring self-administration for southern Yemen. They declared a state of emergency and considered it a coup against legitimacy and the Riyadh Agreement. The remaining two governorates – Aden and Al-Dhale’e – are already controlled by STC.

The positions of the local authorities were reinforced by the absence of popular demonstrations in support of the STC, with the exception of two demonstrations in the districts of Gail Bawazir and Mukalla in the Hadhramaut coast. In turn, the Hadhramaut Valley and Sahara tribal authority endorsed the statements of the governor of Hadhramaut and the governor of the Governorate for Valley and Desert Affairs, rejecting STC’s statement and supporting constitutional legitimacy.

–  Political parties

The National Alliance of Yemeni Political Parties (13 parties) announced its complete rejection of the STC’s announcement of self-administration, and considered it an explicit rebellion against the Yemeni state, an infringement of the powers of the President of the Republic, and a deliberate obstruction of the Riyadh Agreement.

The parties that signed the statement (General People Congress, Yemeni Congregation for Reform ‘Al-Islah’, Arrashad Union Party, Justice and Construction Party, Renaissance Movement for Change, National Solidarity Party, Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party, Peace and Development Party, Peoples’ Democratic Party, Republican Party, Liberation Front, Popular Forces Union, The Nasserist Unionist People’s Organisation) called for Saudi Arabia “to make more efforts to support the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement, and to support the government in its measures to restore the state and maintain the national unity of the country”.

Later, the Yemeni Socialist Party issued a statement calling on the STC to “abandon its statement” and for the legitimate authority to exercise restraint and that they work together to directly implement the Riyadh Agreement.

The Nasserite Unionist People’s Organisation considered STC’s declaration “a new episode in the series of rebellion and overthrow against legitimacy that started in August 2019, and a blatant coup against the Riyadh Agreement”.

For its part, the Houthi movement has refrained from setting an official position on the transitional declaration, with the exception of some tweets on Twitter from some of its leaders, such as Muhammad Ali Al-Houthi, the president of the so-called Revolutionary Committee, who on April 26 tweeted, asking: “Who is impeding the Riyadh Agreement? Do not approach the weaker to describe it as a rebellion, nor declare a new outburst against them before stating if you truly love the South as you claim!” He renewed the demand to implement the Riyadh Agreement.

The content of the Houthi media by its activists is in the interest of the transitional council however, and indicates a collusion between them, and their common interest in undermining the legitimate government and consolidating their control on the ground. Indeed, the transitional factions prevented the delivery of weapons that were sent to the army and the resistance forces in Al-Bayda Governorate.

Regional and international stances

The Arab League announced, in a statement on April 27, its rejection of the STC’s announcement, and affirmed that “the territorial integrity of Yemen is the cornerstone of its position on the crisis in the country”.

The Gulf Cooperation Council called for the continued implementation of the Riyadh Agreement, and the cessation of any escalating attempts or activities reiterating the need for the situation in Aden to return to its previous state.

The Saudi-led Arab Coalition on April 27 rejected the transitional council’s declaration of “self-administration” and stressed the need for the situation to return to its previous state, and the need to stop and cancel any escalations that violate the Riyadh Agreement.

In turn, the United Nations Security Council, in a statement on April 29, expressed grave concern over the STC’s declaration of self-administration in southern Yemen, and stressed on the Council members to make a strong commitment for Yemen’s unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and called for the speedy implementation of the Riyadh Agreement.

Saudi Arabia condemned what the STC have done and their sudden undermining of the Riyadh Agreement, calling on the council to back down from its steps and return to implementing the Riyadh Agreement. The cabinet’s statement on April 29, chaired by King Salman, stressed the statement of the Arab Coalition and called on the transitional council to reverse the decision of self-administration.

On Twitter, the hashtag (#سود-الله-وجه-الخيانة) [May God curse the face of betrayal] was trending, launched by the Saudi media and figures affiliated with the government, with thousands using the hashtag. The hashtag was not targeting the STC alone, but anyone who backed them, hinting at the UAE, which prides itself on supporting the council. The tweets focused on: ‘breaking the pledges of the Riyadh Agreement, lifting arms in the face of Saudi forces, betraying covenants and promises, spreading chaos, backstabbing’.

Thus, it appears that Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the STC has entered a period of tension, which has strengthened Saudi’s suspicions of the Council and its regional relations, and its danger to its national security.

The UAE has adopted escalatory policies towards the Yemeni government, but it is trying to satisfy Saudi Arabia in its media discourse, and is trying to impose changes using arms in the interest of the STC at the expense of the unity of Yemen and Saudi Arabia’s pledges to preserve it and its support for the legitimate government. Despite the fact that the President, Vice-President and some leaders of the STC reside in Abu Dhabi, the UAE on April 27 called on the Council to hold back from making the self-administration announcement and that it opposed any unilateral change in Yemen.

It is evident that the UAE, despite reducing its military presence in southern Yemen, is still keen to employ the transitional council in accordance with its own interests and maintain its influence in the area, especially after Saudi Arabia intensified its relief activities and increased its military forces.

The UK described the decision, through its Ambassador to Yemen, Michael Aaron, as “undermining stability”, expressing the hope that “the STC will cooperate with Saudi Arabia and resume discussions with the Yemeni government on full and speedy implementation of the Riyadh Agreement”. The UK is the country most interested in the political settlement in Yemen.

The US has expressed concern about the seriousness of the STC’s decision, and its Foreign Minister Mike Pompeo has warned of its consequences. Its Ambassador to Yemen, Christopher Henzel, on April 28 called on the STC to return to the political process stipulated in the Riyadh Agreement.

As for Russia, the leadership of the STC tried to extract a Russian position that supports, or at least expresses its understanding of, its declaration of self-administration. STC’s President, Aidros al-Zubaidi, contacted the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Bogdanov, from his residence in the UAE capital Abu Dhabi, but the Russian official confirmed his country’s unremitting approach to finding solutions to issues in Yemen through a comprehensive dialogue between Yemenis, with the assistance of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths. The Russian position was practically reflected in the Security Council statement rejecting the transitional declaration.

China, through its embassy in Yemen on April 28, called for the immediate return and implementation of the Riyadh Agreement, stating that it was the only correct way of solving the southern Yemeni issue, and that it takes into account the interests of the entire Yemeni people. China also confirmed its support for a political solution to the Yemeni issue on the basis of the three references: the Gulf Initiative, the outcomes of national dialogue, and Security Council resolutions (in particular 2216).

The outcome

The lack of international stances in support of STC’s declaration of self-administration reflects the constancy of the international community’s position that adheres to the unity and sovereignty of Yemen in accordance with international decisions. Moreover, the transitional leadership failed to gain any stance in its interest from the international community, despite the resources provided by the UAE, but rather pointed to the representation it gained from the Riyadh Agreement. Observers see the measures taken by STC’s leadership and the speeches of its officials and their media as showing the seriousness of what it could constitute in the future for regional states, especially the neighbourhood of Yemen (Saudi Arabia and Oman). This would be in the event that the STC’s control over Aden and the southern Yemen governorates is stabilised. The experience of the ruling of the Yemeni Socialist Party for the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen before 1990, and the bad relations it had with neighbouring countries is recalled here.

It is noteworthy that the international attitudes towards the situation lacked any threatening language for those who obstruct the political transition process and those who threaten the unity, integrity, and sovereignty of Yemen, which the STC violated, as stipulated by international resolutions, notably Resolution 2216.

Scenarios

The scenarios of political and military developments in Yemen after the STC’s announcement of self-administration are those of an extension of the state of conflict in Yemen and the failure of the Riyadh Agreement. These are according to the determinants of the imbalance of forces of the local parties, all of whom are weak, and obscure the performance of Saudi Arabia.

The first scenario: the formal return to the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement

This scenario is based on the assumption that the STC accepts the return of the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement, according to its welcoming of this as announced on May 1, with the expectation that changes will continue to be made in the mechanisms of implementation of the agreement, the content of which may be lengthy. The STC and its supporters’ aim in participating in the government is to try to weaken it, disrupt its position and attitude towards it, and treat it as an international marketing station.

This scenario reinforces domestic and international reactions denouncing the STC’s announcement of self-administration, and Saudi Arabia’s desire to succeed in its mediation, albeit formally, especially because it believes in its ability to pressure the Yemeni government.

This scenario weakens the failed experience of previous settlements, and the transitional council continuing to impose its practical measures on the ground, especially the appropriation of government revenues and its institutions in the temporary capital of Aden, as well as its military build-up, its attempt to extend its control over the governorate of Socotra, and its contradictory double letter welcoming the return to implementing the Saudi Agreement, while pledging to achieve secession.

The second scenario: failing to reach a permanent settlement

This scenario assumes Saudi Arabia’s inability to persuade or exert pressure on the STC and the UAE to discourage them from the decision of self-administration and rather implement the obligations in the Riyadh Agreement. This could lead to the return of military confrontations between government forces and STC factions, especially in the governorate of Abyan, which is adjacent to Aden. The results of the confrontations in the first instance will depend on the nature of Saudi’s position, the possibility of UAE’s military intervention, and the loyalty of those belonging to the Abyan governorate in the ranks of the STC. On the other hand, the STC will continue to try to expand its control over the southern governorates, especially Socotra and the cities of the coast of Hadhramaut.

Saudi Arabia is expected to avoid confronting STC and will continue its policy of perseverance to try and win over the STC as a whole, or at least some of its factions.

This scenario reinforces the great divergence in the agenda between the legitimate government and the STC, and that of the UAE behind the scenes, and the absence of confidence and will on both sides in reaching a permanent settlement.